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COMMENT
LOUISIANA'S NEWEST CAPITAL CRIME:
THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILD RAPE
ANNALESE FLYNN FLEMING
Those whom we would banish from society or from the human
community itself often speak in too faint a voice to be heard above soci-
ety's demand for punishment. It is the particular role of the courts to
hear these voices, for the Constitution declares that the majoritarian
chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social life. The Court
thus fulfills, rather than disrupts, the scheme of separation of powers by
closely scrutinizing the imposition of the death penalty, for no decision
in a society is more deserving of "sober second thought."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Louisiana, prosecutors are currently seeking the death
penalty against two men accused of raping children in the case
of State v. Wilson. In 1995, Louisiana passed a state law making
it a capital offense to rape a child under twelve. Louisiana Re-
vised Statute 14:42 (C) reads in pertinent part:
Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished
by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence. However, if the victim was under the age of
twelve years... the offender shall be punished by death or life impris-
'McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4, 25 (1936)).
2 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996). By a recent count, there are approximately thirty
other pending rape cases in Louisiana in which the defendants may qualify for the
death penalty. John Q. Barrett, Death for Child Rapists May Not Save Children, NAT'L L.
J., Aug. 18, 1997, atA21.
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onment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspen-
sion of sentence, in accordance with the determination of the jury.3
Prosecutors indicted two defendants, Anthony Wilson and
Patrick Dewayne Bethley, under the new law. Prior to convic-
tion, both moved to quash the indictments, challenging the
statute's constitutionality on its face. The respective trial courts
granted both motions to quash, and the State then appealed to
the Louisiana Supreme Court, which consolidated the cases for
review.5 On appeal, both defendants argued that the law is un-
constitutional because imposing the death penalty for raping a
child is cruel and unusual punishment.6 Although the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court found the law constitutional, the question
bears further examination: is the law constitutional? Or is the
imposition of the death penalty for a non-homicide crime cruel
and unusual punishment?
This Comment proposes that imposing the death penalty
for child rape is unconstitutional because the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits punishments that are disproportionate to the
crimes for which they are imposed. Part 1E reviews the back-
ground law involving the Eighth Amendment and relevant Su-
preme Court case law. Part III analyzes the issues presented by
the decision in State v. Wilson and discusses four hurdles for the
Louisiana statute: (1) a procedural hurdle which insures against
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty;7 (2)
that the punishment must not be excessive in relation to the
crime;8 (3) that the punishment must serve a legitimate goal be-
yond the needless imposition of pain and suffering;9 and (4)
that a punishment must not be so severe as to be unacceptable
to contemporary society.' Part IV concludes that the Louisiana
3 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (C) (West 1995), revised and codified in LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D) (1), (2) (West Supp. 1999) with no relevant changes.
Wi/son, 685 So. 2d at 1063.
5I&
6 id.
7 See infra Part II.B.
a See infra Part IILC.
9 See infra Part II.C.2.
" See infra Part III.D.
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statute will likely be struck down when it reaches the Supreme
Court of the United States because it is excessive punishment
for the crime of rape.
II. BACKGROUND LAW
A. THE ADOPTION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, rati-
fied on December 15, 1791, prohibits the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishments." The Framers took the language of this
amendment from the English Bill of Rights, adopted by Parlia-
ment in 1688, after the English Civil War.'2 The English Bill of
Rights contained the same language: "excessive bail ought not
to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted.", s The prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment was absent from the original body of
the United States Constitution, an exclusion that was hotly de-
bated at the time of enactment. At the Massachusetts Conven-
tion, this exclusion was protested: "Congress shall have to
ascertain... and determine what kind of punishments shall be
inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are nowhere re-
strained from inventing the most cruel and unheard of punish-
ments." 4 At the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry echoed this
fear: "Congress . . .may define crimes and prescribe punish-
ments.... [W] hen we come to punishments, no latitude ought
to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives.
[Without a prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment],
[y] ou let them loose; you do more-you depart from the genius
of your country."5 Clearly, participants at the Conventions were
voicing a desire to enact a ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment to act as a restraint on the laws enacted by the legislatures.
Eventually, this view carried the day, and the Eighth Amend-
" "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII.
" O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
13 Id.
" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258-59 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
2J. ELuOT'S DEBATES 111 (2d ed. 1876)).
" Id at 259 (citing 3J. ELUOT's DEBAiEs 447 (2d ed. 1876)).
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ment was enacted as part of the Bill of Rights. After the Eighth
Amendment became effective, it served as a restraint on the
courts and a warning not to abuse the discretion with which the
courts had been entrusted.6 At this time, the debate surround-
ing cruel and unusual punishment shifted from whether to have
a prohibition to what the prohibition actually meant.
B. THE MEANING OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
1. The Historical Debate
The debate surrounding the meaning of cruel and unusual
punishment began after the adoption of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and continues today. Scholars and jurists
disagree over the original meaning of the Clause, as well as its
present meaning. The Framers included the Eighth Amend-
ment in the Bill of Rights to limit legislative power to prescribe
punishments for crimes, but we have little evidence of how they
defined "cruel and unusual punishment." Certainly the ban
reached torture and other barbaric punishments, as early cases
demonstrate. 7 In Pervear v. Massachusetts,'8 the United States
Supreme Court referred to the Clause for the first time, nearly
eighty years after the Eighth Amendment's ratification. Ordi-
narily, the terms of the Clause applied to something inhuman
and barbarous, such as torture. 9 Examples of cruel and unusual
punishments included being disemboweled alive, burned alive,
beheaded, or drawn and quartered.20  However, none of the
early cases called for an exhaustive definition. In Wilkerson v.
Utah, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits tor-
ture and like punishments of "unnecessary cruelty."2' Several
years later, the Court declared:
6 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910).
17 See, e.g., McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874 (Mass. 1899); In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
18 5 Wall. 475 (1867).
"'See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874 (Mass. 1899).




[D]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the ex-
tent of the constitutional provision, which provides that cruel and un-
usual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that
"punishments of torture ... and all others in the same line of unneces-
sary cruelty, are forbidden" by that amendment to the Constitution....
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the Constitution. It implies .. .something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.2
The first hint that the Clause prohibited more than torture
and other barbaric punishments occurred in 1892. In O'Neil v.
Vermont, the punishment at issue was imprisonment at hard la-
bor for violating the Vermont liquor laws.23 Justice Field, dis-
senting, interpreted the Clause to prohibit not only
punishments which inflict torture, but also "all punishments
which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly dispro-
portioned to the offenses charged."24 This was the first appear-
ance of any discussion of proportionality.
In 1910, in Weems v. United States, the Court firmly rejected
the notion that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause pro-
hibited only torturous and barbaric punishments." At issue was
punishment of imprisonment at "hard and painful labor" for up
to twenty years, loss of all political rights, and surveillance by
authorities for life, all for falsifying an official public docu-
ment.26 Examining the works of various legal scholars, as well as
the debates surrounding the enactment of the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment Clause, the Court concluded that the Framers
must have intended that the ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment include penalties disproportionate to the offenses for
which they are imposed.Y Describing Patrick Henry and others
who championed the enactment of the Clause, the opinion
noted:
Kemmle, 136 U.S. at 447 (1890)(quoting Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135
(1878)).
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
"Id. at 339-40 (Field,J, dissenting).





They were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with
vain imaging, and it must have come to them that there could be exer-
cises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or
mutilation.... [W]e cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cru-
elty being exercised through other forms of punishment was over-
looked.2
The Court in Weems expanded the definition of cruel and
unusual punishment, recognizing that its vitality depended on
its ability to expand in application.29
Examining the English definition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the Weems Court observed:
[T]he earliest application of the provision in England was in 1689... to
avoid an excessive pecuniary fine imposed upon Lord Devonshire by the
court of the King's Bench.... [T]he House of Lords ... decided that
the fine 'was excessive and exorbitant, against the Magna Carta, the
common right of the subject, and the law of the land."
Therefore, the English definition explicitly embraced the
concept that punishments (in this case fines) can be excessive
with respect to the offenses for which they are imposed. Un-
doubtedly the Framers knew of this English definition when
they chose to copy the language of the English Bill of Rights,
which suggests their intent that the Eighth Amendment include
a ban on excessive punishments.
Weems was also the first case to note the flexibility of the
Clause prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.3' After ex-
amining several state cases and works by commentators, the
Court concluded that "[t] he clause of the Constitution... may
therefore be progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice.3 2
2Id.
Weens, 217 U.S. at 373.0 Id. at 376 (quoting 11 State Trials 1354).
3, Id. at 378.




2. The Death Penalty in Recent Years: The Road to Coker v. Georgia
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Warren, reiterated
the flexibility of the Clause in 1958:
The exact scope of the Constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual'
has not been detailed by this Court. But the basic policy reflected in
these words is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of
criminal justice .... The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the
power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be ex-
ercised within the limits of civilized standards ... [T]he words of the
Amendment are not precise, and their scope is not static. The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the prog-
Soit33
ress of a maturing society.
A look at the Supreme Court's modem death penalty juris-
prudence must begin with McGautha v. California.4 Prior to
McGautha, the Court had been under pressure for decades to
rule on whether the death penalty was constitutional as pun-
ishment for any crime.3s At issue in McGautha was whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
standards limiting the sentencer's discretion in choosing a pen-
alty.6 The Court held that it did not, in part because such gen-
eral standards would be impossible to develop, given the variety
of cases. 7
Later the same year, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court held
unconstitutional death penalty schemes which leave the deci-
sion of whether or not to impose the death penalty to undi-
rected juror discretion.3 The decision made unconstitutional
every state's death penalty scheme and resulted in vacated death
sentences for all 629 persons on death row at the time.t 9 In
Furman, five justices wrote separate concurring opinions, but all
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,99-101 (1958) (emphasis added).
'402 U.S. 183 (1971).
m Michael Mello, Executing Rapists: A Reluctant Essay on the Ethics of Legal Scholarship,
4 WM. & MARYJ. WoMEN & L. 129, 141 (1997).
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 183.
Id. at 196-208.
"408 U. S. 238 (1972).
Mello, supra note 35, at 141.
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held that the death penalty may not be imposed in an "arbitrary
and capricious" manneri4 From Chief Justice Warren's oft
quoted comments in Trap v. Dulles,4 Justice Brennan, concur-
ring in the judgment, concluded that "[a] punishment is 'cruel
and unusual,' therefore, if it does not comport with human dig-
nity. ,  He pointed to four principles inherent in the Clause:
(1) that even criminals have human dignity; (2) that the State
must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment; (3) that a severe
punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society;
and (4) that severe punishment must not be excessive.
The next great leap in death penalty jurisprudence oc-
curred in 1976, with Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases.
In Gregg, the Court upheld the imposition of the death penalty
when applied under sentencing procedures that narrow the
class of death-eligible defendants and provide adequate infor-
mation and guidance to the sentencing authority as to who
should be sentenced to death.44 As a general proposition, a sys-
tem which provides for bifurcated proceedings at which the sen-
tencing authority receives information relevant to the
' Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 447 (1980) (summarizing the Court's holding
in Furman).
4" See supra text accompanying note 33.
'
2Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan,J., concurring).
I&. at 270-79.
41 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (Texas capital sentencing procedure which re-
quired jury to consider five categories of aggravating circumstances, which permitted,
as interpreted by Texas courts, consideration of mitigating circumstances, and which
focused on the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and individual
offender was not unconstitutional on theory that it would lead to arbitrary and capri-
cious imposition); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (holding that Florida sen-
tencing procedures requiring judge to consider specific aggravating and mitigating
factors, requiring judge to set forth written findings when the death penalty was im-
posed, and calling for review by the Florida Supreme Court were not unconstitu-
tional). Cf Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a
Louisiana death penalty scheme which narrowly defined five categories of first-degree
murder for which the death penalty was mandatory and which required juries in all
first-degree murder cases to also be instructed on manslaughter and second-degree
murder even if there was not a scintilla of evidence to support such a verdict); Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that imposition of a mandatory
death sentence without consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender or the circumstances of the particular offense was inconsistent with the
Eighth Amendment and therefore unconstitutional).
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imposition of the sentence, and standards to guide its use of
that information, best meets the concern of arbitrary and capri-
cious application.4 However, merely providing these proce-
dures does not guarantee that the Supreme Court will find a
sentencing scheme constitutional, and each system will be ex-
amined individually.
46
In Gregg v. Georgia, Georgia's statutory sentencing scheme
met Furman's procedural requirements by: (1) providing for
separate sentencing procedures where evidence of aggravating
and mitigating factors can be presented to the jury; (2) requir-
ing that a jury find at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance before imposing the death penalty; and (3) providing for
an automatic appeal to, and review by, the state supreme court
as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty.
47
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S PROPORTIONALITYANALYSIS: COKER V.
GEORGIA
When one of the pending cases results in a death sentence,
and the United States Supreme Court finally reviews Louisiana
Revised Statute § 14:42(c), the State of Louisiana will face a ma-
jor hurdle because it will have to prove that executing child rap-
ists does not violate the Supreme Court's decision in Coker v.
Georgia.48 In Coker, a divided Supreme Court held that imposing
the death penalty for raping an adult woman was cruel and un-
usual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.49
Coker escaped from the correctional facility where he was
serving various sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and ag-
gravated assault. He entered the house of the Carvers, threat-
ened them with a knife, and raped sixteen-year-old Mrs. Carver.
He then fled in the Carvers' car, taking Mrs. Carver with him.
Apprehended a short time later, he was charged with escape,




7 Id. at 206-07.
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
49Id
1999] 725
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armed robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping, and rape. He
was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape count.,50
The fourJustice plurality held the death penalty unconstitu-
tional in cases of rape, explaining that "a sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment."5 In support of its holding, the Supreme Court
cited objective evidence of contemporary society's attitude to-
wards the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
rape.5 2 At the time of Coker, "[t]he current judgment with re-
spect to the death penalty for rape [was] not wholly unanimous
among state legislatures, but it obviously weigh[ed] very heavily
on the side of rejecting capital punishment for raping an adult
woman."53 Only three states allowed the imposition of the death
penalty for any rape (adult or child), which the Justices inter-
preted as a legislative rejection of the death penalty for rape.5
The Court acknowledged the seriousness of rape. The
plurality opinion defined it as a violent crime, which "[s]hort of
homicide,... is the 'ultimate violation of self.'"55 Accompanied
by psychological and often physical damage to the victim, as wel
as injury to the public, rape undermines a community's sense of
security. 7 Despite the gravity of the offense, the Court con-
cluded that rape was not as grave a crime as murder in terms of
blameworthiness of the defendant and resulting public injury. s
0 Id at 587-91.
"Id. at 592.52Id. at 593.
"Id. at 596 (concluding that society generally rejects the death penalty for rape of
an adult woman when Georgia was the only jurisdiction with a statute making the
rape of an adult woman a capital offense, and only two others made the rape of a
child a capital offense).
m Id. at 595-97.
"Id
Id (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIcE, LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ASSSTANCE
ADMINISTRATION REPORT, RAPE AND rrs VIcTIMs: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH
FACILITIES AND CRmIuNALJUSTICE AGENCIES 1 (1975)).




The Coker Court drew a bright line between those who kill and
those who do not.
59
There are problems with some of the Court's language in
this passage. One can certainly dispute the conclusion that rape
does not include the serious injury to another person, or that
life for the rape victim is normally not beyond repair. Indeed,
for many rape victims, living with victimization is more difficult
than death. Additionally, many rapes involve serious physical
injury. However, courts must take from this language the man-
date that they must draw a line between crimes that result in
death and those that do not.
The Court concluded that since rapists, as such, do not take
the lives of their victims, they therefore do not deserve the
death penalty.60 In Coker, the Court specifically rejected a sen-
tencing scheme in which some murderers would not receive the
death penalty, while some rapists would.61  The Justices distin-
guished between crimes which result in loss of life, and crimes
which do not.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result, but
wrote separately to express their views that the death penalty al-
ways constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.6 2 Justice Powell
concurred with the result based on the facts of Coker, but dis-
sented because he felt the opinion was overbroad, and the
death penalty might be appropriate in rape cases which were
particularly brutal or heinous.0 ChiefJustice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist dissented on the grounds that Georgia did not lack
Id. ("Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does
not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer
kills; the rapist, if nothing more than that, does not.").
SId. at 598. Commentators have taken this statement as a signal that death would
be disproportionate for any rape. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRImNAL LAw § 6.05(B) (2d ed. 1995) (concluding that "[d]eath, therefore, is a con-
stitutionally inappropriate penalty for rape (or, one would assume from the Court's
reasoning, for any other offense), if no life is taken"); ROLLN M. PERKINS & RONALD
N. BOYCE, CamzNAL LAw 25 (3d ed. 1982) (noting that "the Court will hold that capi-
tal punishment is always, regardless of circumstances, a disproportionate crime for
the penalty of rape").
6 See coker, 433 U.S.'at 600.
62 Id.
" Id at 601 (Powell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the constitutional power to impose the death penalty for rape,
and in striking down the death penalty imposed on Coker, the
Court was overstepping "the bounds of proper constitutional ad-
judication by substituting its policy judgment for that of the
state legislature."6 It is in the shadow of this Supreme Court
precedent that Louisiana passed its statute allowing the death
penalty for child rape.
Ill. ANALYSIS
A. THE CURRENT CONFLICT: STATE V. WILSON
The defendant in the first case, Anthony Wilson, was in-
dicted by a grand jury on December 21, 1995, for the aggravated
rape of a five year old girl.6 Moving to quash the indictment
based on a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute,
Wilson argued that the crime of rape is not punishable by
death.& The trial court granted Wilson's motion to quash, and
the state appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court.67
The defendant in the second case, Patrick Dewayne Bethley,
was charged with raping three girls, ages five, seven, and nine,
between December 1, 1995 andJanuary 10, 1996.r One of the
girls is his daughter.0 The state alleged that Bethley knew he
was HIV positive at the time of the crimes. 70 Bethley filed a mo-
tion to quash, arguing that La. R.S. § 14:42 (C) was unconstitu-
tional on its face because imposing the death penalty for rape
violates the Eighth Amendment.' The trial court found § 14:42
(C) constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, the Four-
teenth Amendment (Equal Protection Clause) and under the
Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (La. 1996).








Louisiana Constitution. 72 However, the trial court struck down
the statute on the ground that it did not sufficiently limit the
class of death-eligible defendants, and therefore was subject to
arbitrary and capricious application. 7s
On appeal the cases were consolidated and the Louisiana
Supreme Court found § 14:42 (C) constitutional because the
death penalty was not an excessive punishment for child rape,
nor was the statute susceptible to arbitrary or capricious applica-
tion.74 Two Justices concurred in the result, and wrote sepa-
rately to assign reasons, 75 and two Justices dissented, one of
whom thought the statute was unconstitutional under Coker.76
Defendant Bethley petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari, which was denied on June 2, 1997. Jus-
tices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer issued a statement, respect-
ing the denial of certiorari, but stating that "[i] t is worth noting
the existence of an arguable jurisdictional bar to our review.
Our consideration of state court decisions is confined to '[flinal
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had.' ... Petitioner has been nei-
ther convicted of nor sentenced for any crime."7 They went on
to say that in the context of a criminal prosecution, the imposi-
tion of a sentence normally constitutes finality.9 This case will
likely be reviewed by the Supreme Court once the trial court is-
sues a final judgment.
The background law of the Eighth Amendment, Supreme
Court case law, and State v. Wilson combine to present three is-
sues: (1) is the Louisiana statute subject to arbitrary and capri-
cious application?; (2) is the death penalty excessive
7 Id- "No law shall subject any person to ... cruel, excessive, or unusual punish-
ment." LA. CONSr. art. I, §20. "[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1065.
74 Id at 1073.
7 id.
7' Id at 1074 (Calogero, C.J., dissenting).
7Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
7Id. at 2425-26.
"Id. at 2426 (quoting Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 620 (1981)).
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punishment for child rape?; and (3) does society consider the
death penalty acceptable punishment for raping a child?
B. THE LOUISIANA STATUTE PASSES FURMAN'S PROCEDURAL TEST
To comply with Furman, the discretion of the fact finder in
the guilt phase of the trial must also "be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action."0 Consistent with this, "an aggravating circum-
stance [considered by the sentencing authority] must genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and
must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of [the same
crime] .,,81
To pass constitutional muster on procedural grounds, the
Louisiana statute must provide a bifurcated trial structure, with
separate guilt and sentencing phases. At the sentencing phase,
the jury must consider aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, and the sentencing procedure must provide proper
guidance to limit jury discretion. The sentencing scheme must
sufficiently narrow the class of defendants eligible to receive the
death penalty. Finally, the sentencing structure must provide
for mandatory review by the Louisiana Supreme Court of any
death sentences imposed.
1. Bifurcated Trials: Individualized Considerations
In Louisiana, "[t]he jury charged with the task of deciding
between death or some other penalty is not given unbridled dis-
cretion in the decision making process."8 2 The Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure provides guidelines for ensuring against
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. Article
905 provides for a bifurcated trial structure and requires a sepa-
rate sentencing hearing held after conviction.u At the sentenc-
0 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion).
" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1071 (La. 1996).
LA. CODE c(m. Paoc. ANN. art. 905 (West 1995). The statute reads: "Following a
verdict or plea of guilty in a capital case, a sentence of death may be imposed only af-
ter a sentencing hearing as provided herein."
[Vol. 89
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ing hearing, the jury weighs individual considerations. "[T]he
jury considers evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances to determine whether a particular defendant should re-
ceive a death sentence for the particular crime committed."4
Article 905.2 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure re-
quires that "[t]he sentencing hearing shall focus on the circum-
stances of the offense, the character and propensities of the
offender."o Therefore, Louisiana's sentencing scheme complies
with the constitutional requirements outlined by the Supreme
Court.&
2. Narnwing the Class ofDeath Eligible Defendants
The Supreme Court requires that "when a sentencing body
is given such discretion as to determine whether a life should be
taken, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as
to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious application."7
The sentencing scheme must sufficiently narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants. The scheme can narrow the class in
one of two ways: (1) the legislature may itself narrow the defini-
tion of capital offenses; or (2) the legislature may broadly define
capital offenses and provide for narrowing by requiring jury
findings of aggravating circumstances at the sentencing phase.ts
Louisiana's sentencing scheme is constitutional because the
legislature narrowed the definition of capital offenses.ts The
Louisiana statute narrows the class of convicted rapists eligible
for the death penalty by requiring a conviction on a count of
aggravated rape for death penalty eligibility. Further, the victim
of the rape must be under twelve years of age in order for the
'4 State v. Watson, 449 So. 2d 1321, 1325 (La. 1984).
LA. CODE CuM. PRoc. ANN. art 905.2 (West 1995).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (interpreting the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to require individualized consideration of mitigating factors in capital
cases).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
SLowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1071 (La. 1996).
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defendant to be death-eligible. 9° If a crime lacks that aggravat-
ing circumstance, the defendant is not death-eligible. The Lou-
isiana scheme narrows the class of death-eligible defendants
sufficiently to pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court
has held this type of sentencing scheme constitutional.9'
3. Mandatory Review for Proportionality
A capital sentencing scheme must provide for mandatory
review of all death sentences for proportionality.92 The Louisi-
ana statute requires the Louisiana Supreme Court to review
every death sentence imposed for constitutionality.93 The court
must look at "(1) whether the sentence was imposed under in-
fluence of passion, prejudice, or arbitrary factors; (2) whether
the evidence supported a finding of a statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance; and (3) whether the sentence, in view of both the
offense and the offender, is disproportionate to the penalty im-
posed in other cases." 94
Louisiana's sentencing scheme complies with the proce-
dural requirements of Furman. It provides for a bifurcated trial
structure, including a separate sentencing hearing for consid-
eration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It provides
guidance to the sentencing authority as to who may receive a
sentence of death, thereby curbing the sentencing authority's
discretion. It narrows the class of death-eligible defendants at
the guilt phase of the trial, and also provides for mandatory re-
view for proportionality of all death sentences by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
C. PUNISHMENT MUST NOT BE EXCESSIVE
Although Louisiana's sentencing scheme passes constitu-
tional muster on Furman's procedural grounds, it fails the
Eighth Amendment's test on proportionality grounds. A pun-
- LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:42 (1995). The Court has held that even when the ag-
gravating circumstance is identical to an element of the crime, the death sentence is
not invalid. Lowenfie/, 484 U.S. at 246.
9, Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1071 (citing Lowenfild, 484 U.S. at 246).
"Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
13 LA. CDE RIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.9 (West 1995).
State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190, 199 (La. 1994).
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ishment is unconstitutional if it is excessive in comparison to the
severity of the offense. 5 A punishment is excessive and uncon-
stitutional if it (1) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime, or (2) makes no measurable contribution to the ac-
ceptable goals of punishment, and hence is nothing more than
the needless imposition of pain and suffering.97  This two-
pronged test determines if a punishment is excessive; if either
prong is met, the punishment is excessive and therefore uncon-
stitutional.
1. The Punishment Must be Proportionate to the Crime
Although questions may remain about whether the Framers
intended the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to ban all
disproportionate punishments, the Supreme Court has read a
ban on disproportionate punishments into the Clause, at least
with regard to the death penalty. 8 In determining whether a
punishment is disproportionate to a given crime, a court must
weigh three factors: (1) the severity of the penalty;" (2) the
gravity of the offense; °'0 and (3) at times the blameworthiness of
the defendant.10'
a) Severity of the Penalty
There is no question that death as a punishment is unique
in its severity and irrevocability. 0 2 Death is the most severe pun-
ishment that could possibly be imposed, and it is completely ir-
revocable.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
96 id.
"See supra Part I.B and Part II.C. It is unclear if under current law, there is a gen-
eral proportionality guarantee inherent in the Eighth Amendment when the death
penalty is not the punishment being examined. For a treatment of this topic, see Les
A. Martin, Harmelin v. Michigan: The Demise of the Eighth Amendment's Pmportionality
Guarantee, 38 Loy. L. REv. 255 (1992). See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
" Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,597-98 (1977).
"'Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
"' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring).
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b) Gravity of the Offense
The second factor weighed in determining the proportion-
ality of the death penalty in relation to a given crime is the grav-
ity of the offense. This includes the amount of harm caused to
the victim of the crime, as well as any resulting public injury,
such as "undermin [ing] a community's sense of security. "'O'
The Court has refused to draw a clear line distinguishing
those crimes grave enough to warrant the death penalty and
those that do not.1 4 Purporting to acknowledge this, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court claimed to know the Supreme Court's
mind:
The Coker Court recognized the possibility that the degree of harm
caused by an offense could be measured not only by the injury to a par-
ticular victim but also by the resulting public injury. This implies that
some offenses, in particular the rape of a child, might be so injurious to
the public that death would not be disproportionate in relation to the
crime for which it is imposed.
0 5
The crime of raping a child, by itself, does not take a life.
The Louisiana Court acknowledged the argument that the
death penalty should not be imposed for non-homicides' 6 De-
spite precedent, the court concluded that the death penalty is
not disproportionate to the crime of raping a child because:
[c] ontemporary standards as defined by the legislature indicate that
the harm inflicted upon a child when raped is tremendous. That child
suffers physically, as well as emotionally and mentally, especially since the
overwhelming majority of offenders are family members. Louisiana
courts have held that sex offenses against children cause untold psycho-
. 107
logical harm not only to the victim but also to generations to come.
The court proposed that because the Supreme Court has
declined to draw a clear line, it ought to defer to legislative
'03 Coker 433 U.S. at 59698.





judgment on the matter'08  Concluding that the Eighth
Amendment only bars the death penalty for minor crimes, the
Louisiana court asserted that the crime of raping a child under
twelve is not a minor crime, and therefore the death penalty is
not excessive. The court also quoted Gregg v. Georgia as justifi-
cation for its conclusion: "In part, capital punishment is an ex-
pression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive
conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is
essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on le-
gal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs."110
In Wilson, the defendants argued that death is a dispropor-
tionate penalty for the crime of rape because rape is not as
grave a crime as murder.' The defendants contended that the
following quote from Coker applies equally to raping a child as it
does to the rape of an adult woman:
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the pub-
lic, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another
crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the seri-
ous injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the
rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over
and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that
the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability,' . ..
is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human
life. 
2
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the assumption that
a rapist causes less harm than a murderer because in some cases
women have preferred death to being raped, or have taken
their own lives after being raped."1 It also rejected the argu-
'led. (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987)).
109 I&
Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
. Id. at 1065.
, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
M Wson, 685 So. 2d at 1066 n.3 (citing DavidJ. Karp, Coker v. Georgia: Dispor-
tionate .Punishment and theDeath PenallyforRape, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1714, 1720 (1978)).
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ment that Coker controlled their analysis, noting that the plural-
ity in Coker took "great pains in referring only to the rape of
adult women throughout their opinion,14 leaving open the
question of [whether imposing the death penalty for] the rape
of a child [is constitutional]. 15 Reasoning that since the Coker
Court described the rape of an adult woman as a serious crime
which violated the self (only murder could violate the self
more), the court concluded that the Louisiana Legislature cor-
rectly found the rape of a child even more detestable." The
court explained that children are a special class, in need of spe-
cial protection and particularly vulnerable since they are not
mature enough to defend themselves.'17 Child rape causes ter-
rible emotional and often physical harm to the victim, and also
causes a devastating blow to the sense of safety in a commu-
nity."8
The Louisiana Court correctly concluded that the crime of
raping a child is not a minor one. It is a heinous crime, which
should be punished severely. The court also concluded cor-
rectly that the child victim of rape suffers tremendous harm. A
child is vulnerable, unable to protect herself, particularly if a
family member perpetrates the crime. However, the court er-
roneously concluded that the death penalty is not a dispropor-
tionate punishment for the crime of child rape.
The Louisiana Court asserted that the Supreme Court's
analysis in Coker does not apply to the cases before it because the
Coker holding is limited to cases in which the death penalty is
imposed for the rape of an adult woman.' Rape of a child dif-
fers from the rape of an adult woman "[s]ince children cannot
protect themselves... [and] are a class of people that need spe-
cial protection; they are particularly vulnerable since they are
not mature enough nor capable of defending themselves.
'1 20
" Id. at 1066.
115 Id
6 & at 1066-67.
11 & at 1067.
"a Id.
I. d. at 1066. The court pointed to fourteen times that the Justices in Coker re-
ferred to the victim as an "adult woman." Id.
,20 Id. at 1067.
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The Louisiana Court makes a strong argument here; rape, espe-
cially child rape, causes emotional and physical trauma to its vic-
tim.
However, the Court in Coker drew the line: if the perpetrator
of the crime does not take human life, the death penalty is dis-
proportionate. Raping a child, if unaccompanied by any other
crime, does not result in death. It is a heinous and serious
crime deserving of severe punishment; however, because it does
not result in loss of life, it does not deserve the death penalty.
To impose capital punishment on a defendant convicted of rap-
ing a child would be excessive punishment, which violates the
Eighth Amendment.
c) Blameworthiness of Defendant
The culpability or blameworthiness of the defendant at
times also weighs in determining the proportionality of the pun-
ishment in relation to a given crime. "The focus [has to] be on
his culpability,... for we insist on 'individualized consideration
as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sen-
tence'...,i2
The defendants in Wilson challenged the statute as uncon-
stitutional because it permits the death penalty without a find-
ing of intent.1 22 The defendants argued that this makes the rape
of a child a more severe crime than murder since murder re-
quires intent to kill, whereas the Louisiana statute does not re-
quire a specific intent to rape a child under twelve.12 The court
dealt with this challenge by pointing out that "[ t ] he statute does
not make the death penalty automatic for the rapist as opposed
to the murderer. Once the rapist is found guilty, he proceeds to
the sentencing hearing in which he is permitted to introduce
any mitigating evidence." 124 Therefore, if the rapist was mis-
taken as to age of the victim, he may introduce that fact at the
sentencing hearing as a mitigating factor through evidence that
t2' Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 605 (1978)). See also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
'" Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1072.




he truly thought the victim was of age, based on appearances or
representation. The court also pointed out, however, that
"[r] ape of a child is an intentional crime in and of itself... [be-
cause] one does not 'accidentally' rape a child."12
The Louisiana Court proposed that the death penalty is
permissible in some situations when the defendant has neither
killed nor intended to kill anyone.126 The court cited Tison -v.
Arizona, which held that the death penalty is not disproportion-
ate punishment for a defendant whose participation in a felony
that results in murder was major, and whose mental state was
one of reckless indifference.'2 In Tison, the Petitioner and his
brothers had helped plan and effect the escape of their father
from prison, where he was serving a life sentence for killing a
prison guard during a previous escape attempt.12 After they
carried out their escape plan, they helped abduct, detain, and
rob a family of four.'2 They watched while their father and an-
other accomplice murdered the members of that family with
shotguns the defendants had procured and provided to use in
the escape.3 The trial court convicted them of capital murder
under Arizona's felony murder and accomplice liability statutes
and sentenced them to death.'3' The Supreme Court upheld
the death sentences, asserting that the Petitioners' mental states
had been those of reckless indifference, which constituted a
culpable mental state.132
The Louisiana court was wrong to rely on Tison. Tison is
very different from Wilson. Tison does hold that the death pen-
alty can be imposed on defendants who neither directly kill, nor
specifically intend to kill anyone, but the crimes committed in
Tison resulted in the deaths of four innocent people. The crime
of raping a child, on the other hand, does not result in death.
The Supreme Court upheld the death penalty if imposed under
2' Id. at 1072-73.
2 Id. at 1069.
'27 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
'2 Id. at 139.
' Id. at 140-41.
3 Id at 139-41.
131 Id. at 141-42.
-2 I& at 151.
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the felony murder doctrine on defendants who played a major
role in the felony which resulted in murder and had a mental
state of reckless indifference (the defendants in Tison procured
the guns for the prison escape of their father and must have
known someone could be killed in the escape, but participated
in it anyway). However, the Court has not held that the death
penalty may be imposed on defendants who neither kill nor in-
tend to kill anyone when they commit crimes that do not result
in the victim's death.
In Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the
death penalty is an excessive penalty for a robber who does not
take a life.138 In Enmund, the defendant was driving the getaway
car, and was nowhere near the crime scene when two people
were shot during the commission of a robbery.M  There was no
proof that any killing had been contemplated prior to the
commission of the crime by the defendant, or by the two ac-
complices who committed the robbery and the murders.' At-
tempting to distinguish the crime in Enmund from the crime of
child rape, the court in Wilson asserted that "[i]n Enmund, the
defendant simply aided and abetted a robbery," while the Lou-
isiana statute "contemplates a defendant who rapes a child."'
16
Certainly society finds the rape of a child more morally repug-
nant than a robbery. However, the legislature could address
that by making child rape punishable by life imprisonment, or
by some other term of incarceration more severe than that im-
posed on the robber. The conclusion that child rape should re-
ceive the death penalty does not follow from the premise that
society finds it more morally repugnant than robbery.
The Supreme Court has weighed the culpability or blame-
worthiness of the defendant only in the context of felony mur-
der. The Court did not reach this analysis in Coker, instead it
drew a line between rape, which does not result in the loss of
human life, and homicides, which do. The Court has drawn a
bright line which the Louisiana Court failed to follow. If a
' 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
1 Id.1 Id. at 798.
13 State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996).
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crime results in the loss of human life, courts may impose the
death penalty if the defendant had a culpable mental state and
played a major role in the crime. If no loss of life results, it be-
comes unnecessary to determine whether the defendant had a
culpable mental state or whether he played a major role in the
crime. The death penalty is disproportionate punishment for
crimes which do not result in loss of human life.
2. No Needless Imposition of Pain and Suffering
Legitimate goals of punishment include retribution and de-
terrence.1 7 Punishment is excessive, and does not serve these
goals if it involves the needless imposition of pain and suffer-
ing.'s First, "the punishment must not involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain." 139 Second, the type of punish-
ment imposed for a given crime must serve an acceptable goal
of punishment.
In a society that requires its citizens not to retaliate, but
rather to look to the law to vindicate wrongs done to them, the
goal of retribution is critically important. The Supreme Court
explained that:
[t]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channel-
ing that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an impor-
tant purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law.
When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or un-
able to impose on criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,'
then there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice,
and lynch law. 40
Behind the principle of retribution is the idea that people
must take responsibility for their actions; that is, when they do a
wrong to society by committing a crime, they must pay in some
way to make it right. "The theory of retributive justice is a the-
""7 Id. Retribution is defined as "deserved punishment for evil done." WEBS EW'S
NEw UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DIcTIONARY 1548 (2d ed. 1983). Deterrence derives
from 'deter', meaning "to discourage or keep from doing something." Id. at 496.
GS regg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
ISO Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
"
40Id. at 308 (StewartJ., concurring).
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ory of just desserts, and some notion that the punishment
should fit the crime is inherent in that theory."
1 4
In Wilson, the Louisiana Court confronted the argument
that the Louisiana statute does not serve the principle of retri-
bution because the imposition of the death penalty will have a
chilling effect on the already inadequate reporting of this
crime. The argument continues:
[s]ince arguably most child abusers are family members, the victims and
other family members are concerned about the legal, financial, and
emotional consequences of coming forward. Permitting the death pen-
alty for the crime will further decrease the reporting since no child wants
to be responsible for the death of a family member'4
With decreased reporting, more offenders would escape the
punishment their evil deserves.
In response, the Louisiana Court pointed out that the child
is an innocent victim and the offender is responsible for his ac-
tions.'" The answer, however, is not responsive to the challenge
that the statute fails to serve the principle of retribution. It
points out a truism of child rape but does not at all respond to
the challenge that the death penalty will prevent reporting of an
already underreported crime. Thus, the Louisiana court failed
to explain how the statute promotes the principle of retribution.
The principle of deterrence refers to discouraging people
from committing a crime. Whether a deterrent is successful is
not always easily determined: "statistical attempts to evaluate the
worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential
offenders have occasioned a great deal of debate."'' Some stud-
ies suggest that the death penalty may not have more of a deter-
rent effect than lesser penalties. 146 The death penalty probably
functions as a significant deterrent for some, and not for others.
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent to crime is a
14, State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 651 (Utah 1997).
2 State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996).
143 i
144 id,
" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976).
,
46 1& at 185.
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complex factual issue, the resolution of which properly rests
with the legislatures which can evaluate the results of statistical
studies in light of local conditions and with a flexibility not
available to the courts. 147 However, the judgment and decisions
of a legislature should only be accorded deference to a certain
point; courts must act as a constitutional check on the legisla-
tures.1
48
The Wilson court argued that making child rape a capital
crime would be a deterrent. 49 This is not necessarily true.
While people generally assume that stiffer penalties have a greater
deterrent effect, in fact one may argue that a disproportionately harsh
punishment will undermine the goals of deterrence. Disproportionate
penalties may make prosecutors and sentencers reluctant to seek or im-
pose penalties they see as unjust... [I]f unnecessarily harsh penalties
are imposed, they may still undermine the State's effort to deter more
serious crimes because criminals may recognize that once they have ex-
posed themselves to a capital punishment, the State has no further
power to punish them.I
If prosecutors and sentencers are reluctant to impose the
death penalty, and the criminal knows this, then the punish-
ment loses its deterrent function. Further, if Louisiana imposes
the death penalty for raping a child under twelve, what deters
the rapist from also killing the child? He could receive no
harsher penalty for the murder of the child than for the rape.
Thus, the murder becomes no worse (in terms of punishment
and deterrence) than the rape. Indeed, by killing the child, the
rapist eliminates perhaps the only witness to the crime who
could testify with first hand knowledge. Therefore, the death
penalty fails to serve the principle of deterrence more signifi-
candy than another punishment, such as life imprisonment,
... See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 403-05 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
" Criminal law has always been the domain of the states. United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Often, the states react with
hostility when their power to make criminal laws and fashion criminal penalties is
threatened. However, ours is a federal system, and the Supreme Court's power to
strike down unconstitutional laws is firmly established. Se Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137 (1803).
' 9 State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996).
"o State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 651 (Utah 1997).
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would. The death penalty's severity makes prosecutors less
likely to seek it, and it fails to further deter child rapists from
taking the lives of their victims.
D. ACCEPTABIITY OF PUNISHMENT TO CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
Public attitude toward punishment is very important; a pun-
ishment's validity depends upon its acceptability to contempo-
rary society. Chief Justice Warren's words in Trop v. Dulles are
worth repeating: "[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." 1 Thus, courts must assess con-
temporary values regarding the infliction of the challenged
sanction, the death penalty.1 5 2 This requirement saves the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause from being nothing more than
the subjective views of individual judges.5 3 It means that objec-
tive factors will inform the judgment.-" Examining the laws of
other jurisdictions and evidence of the frequency or infre-
quency with which juries impose a given punishment sheds light
on public attitudes toward that punishment.
1. OtherJurisdictions
In determining the acceptability of a punishment to con-
temporary society, courts should look at the entire country's
opinion of that punishment.55 This entails examining the laws
of other states to determine how many other jurisdictions allow
the imposition of that punishment, for which crimes, and why.'5
The frequency or infrequency of similar or identical laws indi-
cates the public judgment with respect to that crime.57 If all or
most of the other states impose the same punishment for the
same crime, that suggests a general endorsement of that pun-
ishment. If few or none have similar laws on the books, it indi-
"' 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
2 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
I d. at 592.
5 See id at 593.
"'6 See id
"See id at 59-9-94.
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cates that society does not generally endorse the imposition of
that particular punishment for that particular crime.
Laws indicate legislative attitudes; if a legislature chooses to
impose the death penalty for a certain crime, it considers it an
appropriate punishment for that crime. If it chooses to impose
a lesser punishment, it considers that punishment more appro-
priate than the death penalty. When assessing punishments en-
acted by democratically elected legislatures, courts make a
presumption of validity.5 9
In Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court argued for judicial
restraint and deference to the legislature, reasoning that the
legislature, as the voice and pulse of the people, was in the best
position to know and articulate the will of the people.' 60 The
Louisiana court stated that "courts must exercise caution in as-
serting their views over those of the people as announced
through their elected representatives."' 6' The argument for ju-
dicial restraint is persuasive only to a point. Justice Brennan has
explained:
[W]e must not, in the guise of 'judicial restraint,' abdicate our funda-
mental responsibility to enforce the Bill of Rights. Were we to do so, the
"constitution would indeed beas easy of application as it would be defi-
cient in efficiency and power. Its general principles would have little
value and be controverted by precedent into impotent and lifeless for-
mulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality."'6
Deference to the legislature, therefore, cannot weigh more
heavily than a court's responsibility to enforce the Constitution,
and courts must determine for themselves whether a penalty is
acceptable.
According to the Supreme Court, "one of the most conser-
vative and acceptable methods of determining the excessiveness
of a penalty is to examine the statutes of the other states."'0
158 See i&I
'
59 Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).






, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 343, 373 (1910)).
1 Gregg 428 U.S. at 179.
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Louisiana is the only state that imposes the death penalty for the
rape of a child.
In the years since Coker, the Mississippi, Florida, and Ten-
nessee Supreme Courts have invalidated state statutes which
made rape of a child a capital offense.'6 Mississippi did so in
Leathenwood v. Mississippi.165 In Leatherwood, the defendant was
convicted of raping an eleven year-old child and sentenced to
death.' 66 The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the maxi-
mum punishment for raping a child is life imprisonment.167
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Collins v. State, invali-
dated a statute which mandated the death penalty for raping a
child.ss Significantly, in the intervening twenty years, Tennes-
see has not re-enacted a statute allowing, rather than requiring,
the death penalty for the rape of a child. If the legislature in
Tennessee found it acceptable and desirable to execute crimi-
nals who rape children, it would have enacted a statute allowing
the death penalty to be imposed on such criminals. Tennessee's
current lack of such a statute suggests that public opinion in
Tennessee weighs against imposing the death penalty for the
rape of a child.
The Florida Supreme Court invalidated a child rape death
penalty statute' 69 in Buford v. State170 In Buford the defendant was
convicted of first degree murder, sexual battery of a child under
eleven years of age, and burglary with intent to commit sexual
battery.17' He was sentenced to death for both the murder
' Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981); Leatherwood v. Mississippi, 548 So.
2d 889 (Miss. 1989); Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977).
'6' 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989). The statute at issue was Miss. CoDE ANN. § 97-3-65
(1974), which stated "(e)very person eighteen (18) years of age or older who shall be
convicted of rape by carnally and unlawfully knowing a child under the age of four-
teen (14) years, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for
life..."
'" Leatherwood, 548 So. 2d 389.
"'Ic& at 403.
' 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977).
" The statute read in relevant part "[A] person 18 years of age or older who
commits sexual battery upon, or injures the sexual organs of, a person less than 12
years of age in an attempt to commit sexual battery upon such person commits a capi-
tal felony..." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (West 1976).
70 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981).
7 Id. at 944.
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charge and the sexual battery charge.'7 The defendant ap-
pealed, in part challenging the constitutionality of the death
sentence imposed for sexual battery as cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Florida
Supreme Court found Coker v. Georgia controlling.'7 The Flor-
ida Court applied the Coker analysis to the imposition of the
death penalty for the rape of a child, following the bright line
drawn by the Coker court between crimes which cause the death
of the victim and crimes that do not.74 The court explained:
"The reasoning of the justices in Coker v. Georgia compels us to
hold that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of sexual assault and is
therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual punishment. ' 75
In Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged that
Louisiana is the only state to impose the death penalty for rap-
ing a child. 76 Insisting that this fact did not determine exces-
siveness, the court pointed out that at the time of Coke, three
other states, Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee, had statutes
authorizing the death penalty in rape cases where the victim was
a child and the offender an adult." The court suggested that
despite subsequent invalidation of those statutes, the fact that
they existed at all might be the beginning of a public trend to-
ward allowing the death penalty in child rape cases, and that the
failure of more states to enact such statutes may mean that those
states are waiting to see what happens to those states which do
enact such statutes."' s To the contrary, it is more likely that the
lack of similar statutes reflects the popular and legislative views
that it is an excessive penalty because after invalidation no -at-
tempts were made to re-enact those statutes in compliance with
the Constitution. It is therefore unlikely that popular attitude
"73 1& at 950.
174 id
"7 Id at 951.
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in those states called for imposing the death penalty on rapists
or that legislatures thought it constitutional to do so.
The court in Wilson pointed out that Mississippi's and Ten-
nessee's statutes were invalidated for infirmities in the statutes
themselves or in the sentencing schemes of the states, and not
because they were unconstitutional violations of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.17
Concluding this point, the court argued "We cannot look solely
at what legislatures have refrained from doing under conditions
of great uncertainty arising from the Supreme Court's 'less than
lucid holdings on the Eighth Amendment. '"'"0
The argument made by the Louisiana Court is not persua-
sive. That three states previously had statutes allowing the im-
position of the death penalty for the rape of a child does not
suggest a trend, particularly when each of those statutes was in-
validated, and not subsequently re-enacted. In fact, the Florida
court found Coker controlling in the context of imposing the
death penalty for child rape. The distinct trend is away from
making child rape a capital offense; Louisiana is the only state
in the country that makes the rape of a child a capital offense.
In a similar context, when eight other states had laws similar to
the one in question at the time, the Supreme Court character-
ized that as a trend away from imposing the death penalty for a
given crime."" Since no other states have laws similar to Louisi-
ana's, Louisiana's law falls under what the Court has defined as
society's rejection of the death penalty for the rape of a child.
2. Infrequency of Imposition byJuries
The jury is also a "significant and reliable index of contem-
porary values" because it is drawn from, and directly involved in,
society at large, and therefore represents those values. 82 The
'79 Id. at 1068-69.
& at 1069 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 614).
" In Enmund v. Florida, there were eight other jurisdictions allowing the "imposi-
tion of the death penalty solely for participation in a robbery in which another robber
takes [a] life." 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982). The Court called this "a small minority of
jurisdictions," id. at 792, and concluded that this amounted to "[s] ociety's rejection of
the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony murder." Id. at 794.
' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976).
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Supreme Court has stated that "one of the most important func-
tions any jury can perform in making... a selection [between
life imprisonment and death] is to maintain the link between
contemporary values and the penal system. " 1 3 If juries show a
reluctance to impose the death penalty on defendants convicted
of certain crimes, it suggests that contemporary society thinks so
severe a punishment should be reserved for extreme cases. If
juries tend to impose the death penalty in certain cases, it re-
flects approval of imposing that punishment for that crime.ss
Examining the frequency with which juries impose the death
penalty for a given crime guides courts in determining whether
contemporary society finds the death penalty unacceptable for
certain crimes.
Since 1977, no sentencer has imposed the death penalty on
a defendant in a non-homicide case, even where they would
have been allowed to do so."" Across the country, juries do not
impose the death penalty for crimes that do not result in the
victim's death. This extreme reluctance ofjuries to impose the
death penalty for non-homicides indicates that contemporary
society finds that punishment unacceptable for those crimes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Louisiana's statute allowing the imposition of the death
penalty for the rape of a child is unconstitutional because it vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. The Louisiana Supreme Court wrongly upheld
the statute in Wilson. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari for lack of jurisdiction because there was no final
judgment in the case. Should the trial court convict and sen-
tence either Wilson or Bethley to death, the Court will probably
grant certiorari since it would mark the first time in thirty years
'"Witherspoon v. Illinois, 591 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
' See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 258, 388 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
18 State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 650 & n.ll (Utah 1997) (noting also that there
have been no convictions or death sentences imposed in the Louisiana cases involving
the statute at issue because those cases involve only a pretrial facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the Louisiana statute).
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that a jury sentenced a defendant to death for a non-homicide
crime.
Upon review, the Court will likely strike the law down as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The imposition of the
death penalty for the rape of a child falls under the Court's
analysis in Coker v. Georgia. It rises to the level of excessive pun-
ishment, as it is disproportionate in relation to the crime of
child rape. The crime of raping a child is clearly heinous and
deserving of severe punishment; however, because the crime
does not result in the loss of human life, the Court will likely fol-
low the line drawn in Coker and prohibit imposing the death
penalty for this crime.
Additionally, the Court should strike down the Louisiana
statute. Imposing the death penalty for rape does not serve the
principle goals of punishment. The death penalty does not
serve the goal of retribution because inherent in the concept of
retribution is the notion of proportionality, which the statute
violates. The punishment does not serve the principle of deter-
rence either. It will likely decrease the reporting of an already
underreported crime because most child rapists are family
members. Imposing the death penalty for this crime will make
children and other family members who know about the rape
less likely to come forward, which gives the rapist more security
in knowing he will remain unprosecuted for his crime. To pro-
vide more security to the rapist entails less deterrence.
Contemporary society, represented by state legislators, re-
jects the death penalty for non-homicide crimes, including the
rape of a child, because the Supreme Court indicated in Coker
that it is unconstitutional to do otherwise. It was a message un-
derstood by all but Louisiana, which is the only jurisdiction that
allows the death penalty for the rape of a child. Other jurisdic-
tions have struck down similar laws as unconstitutional within
the last three decades. Most significantly, Florida struck down
its identical law, finding that the Coker analysis controlled. Fi-
nally, no jury has imposed the death penalty in a non-homicide
case in thirty years. Significantly, juries nationwide refuse to
impose the death penalty on criminals who do not kill. This
signifies that contemporary society considers the death penalty
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disproportionate in relation to crimes that do not result in the
loss of human life.
The United States Supreme Court will likely, as it should,
strike down the Louisiana statute.
